A new study by the Iranian Parliament’s research arm has assessed the legal, political and especially economic implications of the activation of the “snapback” mechanism, noting that its primary effect is psychological rather than material. The report argues that the real pressure on Iran’s economy still comes from US secondary sanctions, while the reinstated United Nations measures mainly serve to amplify uncertainty and legitimize broader political action against Tehran.
According to the study, UN sanctions historically carried a narrow, proliferation-related focus, targeting dual-use technologies, missile activity and specific individuals or entities. Unlike US sanctions, they did not directly restrict Iran’s oil exports or shut down its banking system. For this reason, the current reimposition of UN sanctions under the snapback clause has not created an entirely new sanctions regime. Instead, the immediate consequences have appeared in the form of heightened market volatility, currency fluctuations and inflationary pressures.
The snapback provision was embedded in UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the 2015 nuclear agreement. It was designed to ensure reversibility: if a party alleged Iran’s noncompliance, it could refer the issue to the Security Council, triggering an automatic reinstatement of earlier resolutions unless the Council voted otherwise. Although legally contested, the United States and its allies have now invoked this mechanism as Iran reached key “sunset” dates. October 2025, marking the tenth year of the nuclear accord, became the moment of activation.
Between 2006 and 2010, the Security Council adopted six resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, expanding restrictions from enrichment activities to arms transfers and financial measures. Yet even then, analysts noted that it was US unilateral actions—cutting Iranian banks off from SWIFT, sanctioning the central bank and curbing oil sales—that delivered the sharpest economic blows. By contrast, UN sanctions had limited reach and were often enforced unevenly across countries.
Today, the international environment further reduces the likelihood of a cohesive sanctions regime. The report highlights that Russia and China oppose attempts to revive UN restrictions, obstructing new expert panels or enforcement mechanisms. Even European states, though politically aligned with Washington, appear reluctant to fully comply, given their economic stakes and strained transatlantic ties. Thus, the reinstated resolutions lack the enforcement teeth of US secondary sanctions, which threaten third-party access to the American market.
Nonetheless, the study warns that symbolism matters. Sanctions under Chapter VII carry the legitimacy of international law, which can embolden states or companies already hesitant to engage with Iran. Domestically, the reactivation of UN measures has unsettled markets at a time when the economy remains under heavy US pressure. If not managed through sound policy and communication, the psychological shock could deepen existing stagflationary trends.
Looking ahead, the report urges policymakers to mitigate risks through several strategies: leveraging Russian and Chinese support to challenge the legality of unilateral snapback claims, managing domestic expectations to reduce panic-driven currency and asset market swings and accelerating diversification toward Asian and regional trade partners. Above all, the study stresses that Iran should not overestimate the material weight of UN sanctions compared to US measures but must remain vigilant against their political and psychological resonance.
Even with the snapback now activated, it is unlikely to transform Iran’s economic landscape. Its real significance lies in the realm of perception and legitimacy—an arena where effective diplomacy and careful market management will prove more decisive than the legal text of UN resolutions.
