The seventh five-year development plan (fiscal March 2023-24 to March 2027-28) is on track to get the final parliamentary approval at a time when officials and planners in charge of drafting the document had termed it preliminary and unpredictable, Mehdi Pazouki, a professor of economics at the Allameh Tabataba’i University, prefaced an article for the Persian daily Ta’adol with this note. A translation of the full text follows:
Analysts have predicted that such a term [unpredictable] has been included in the preface of the plan to fend off any criticism. But, today, it is clear that in the 7th FYDP, an economic growth of 8% and the annual creation of 1 million jobs have been targeted. These propositions can be considered wishful thinking rather than an actual plan worth implementing.
Budgets are part of the medium-term economic plans and development plans present a perspective of the most important macroeconomic planning. However, the presentation of Iran’s mid- and long-term economic needs has not been observed in this plan.
If the 7th FYDP is to be planned and approved, it should reflect major challenges of Iran’s economy, such as water, business environment, employment, international relations, pension funds, economic democratization, growth of cooperatives and improvement of environmental indicators. Unfortunately, they cannot be traced in Iran’s 7th FYDP. Only some distant hopes and dreams have been included, without presenting a practical mechanism for their realization.
The next important point in the 7th FYDP pertains to the plan’s conceptual domain. It has repeatedly been emphasized that to formulate a development plan, one should believe in the concept of development and have a correct understanding of it. This is while many parliamentarians have basically no understanding of the requisites for development.
Among Iran’s previous development plans, the 3rd FYDP was compiled and launched by people familiar with the concepts of development and economy. The extent of its realization, i.e., 60%, is unique among all development plans devised in the post-revolution era.
The seventh plan’s figures are different from those of the 6th FYDP that saw the lowest level of realization, because the incumbent government [led by President Ebrahim Raisi] basically did not believe in the Sixth Plan, which was extended for two consecutive years.
The next important issue is the institution that compiles the plan. Naturally, the Plan and Budget Organization should formulate the development plan’s rules and regulations. It is one of the most specialized institutions of Iran and any type of mistake in its decision-making system could have destructive consequences for the country’s economy and growth.
However, Iran’s Plan and Budget Organization is currently taking non-specialized decisions. The appointment of non-expert personnel from other organizations as senior managers of PBO will degrade the documents coming out of it. The selection of someone from the Iranian National Tax Administration as the director of PBO and the exodus of tax forces to this organization shows that no proper system is governing this organization. Finally, appropriate measures should be taken by the foreign policy decision-making apparatus.
The dissemination of positive news regarding resumption of relations with Saudi Arabia, the visit of foreign minister of that country, etc. helps improve the general indicators of the economy. Such propositions should be emphasized and recommended in the plan, but no attention has been paid to this issue in the 7th FYDP.
In general, the seventh plan has not been prepared by specialists. In order to gain access to a suitable planning system, the governance system should be reformed so that other decision-making sub-groups are also able to participate in this process.
